If women have different economic preferences than men, then female economic and political empowerment is likely to change policy and household decisions, and in turn macroeconomic outcomes. We test the hypothesis that female enfranchisement leads to lower government budget deficits due gender differences in preferences over fiscal outcomes. Estimating the impact of women's vote on budget deficits in a differences-in-differences regression for Swiss cantonal panel data, we find that including women in the electorate reduces average per capita budget deficits by a statistically significant amount.
Introduction
Most would agree that at some level the average woman is different from the average man.
What is less clear is whether gender differences can also be found in economic behavior, which in turn would affect economic outcomes at the macro level where differences among individuals are averaged out. A small but quickly growing empirical literature looks at how the increasing political and economic influence of women may have contributed to changes in economic outcomes in recent years. Using microeconomic data, Duflo and Udry (2004) and Pitt and Khandker (1998) investigate the impact of the relative influence of women on intra-household resource allocation, and find significant gender effects. preference for social expenditures than men. Therefore, as women gain increasing political power, we should see the size of the state (and social expenditures in particular) increase 2 .
The empirical evidence suggests consistently that female enfranchisement is associated with a change in the composition of public spending, while it is less conclusive on the effect on the size of the state ( This paper contributes to the literature by asking whether women might prefer a different public savings level than men. If this is the case, then granting the right to vote to women may change the course of government budget deficits and debts, and may therefore ultimately affect the sustainability of public finances.
We focus on the impact of women's political influence on public savings for a number of reasons. First, the question has not previously been asked. Women's political influence and the use of deficit financing of public expenditures rose explosively in industrial countries in the post WWII era, making it interesting to know whether women's enfranchisement might have mitigated, or on the contrary added to recent public debt buildups.
The second reason is related to data availability. We use a panel data set for Swiss cantons to test our hypothesis, which has abundant data on government budgets while data on aggregate cantonal savings and many other macroeconomic variables are scarce. Third, we measure women's political influence by whether or not women have the right to vote, which, we argue in the following, can be considered a fairly exogenous measure of political influence compared to other measures used in the literature. Female suffrage proxies women's political influence on fiscal outcomes relatively well, while women's influence on other macroeconomic outcomes (such as household savings or investment decisions) is more complex and would hence be less well captured by female suffrage alone.
The way in which cantonal female suffrage was introduced in Switzerland provides conditions akin to a social experiment. Female enfranchisement was introduced in different years across cantons, and relatively recently (women were first given the right to vote in Neuchâtel and Vaud in 1959, and the last canton to grant women the vote was Appenzell I. Rh. in 1990 -all other 23 cantons introduced women's suffrage between these dates), allowing for a substantial amount of variation both in the time and in the cross-section
dimensions. An additional advantage of this data set is that by studying the sub-federal level rather than national governments, and by using a difference-in-differences estimator, we reduce possible unmeasurable differences in political institutions and economic characteristics across the cross-sectional units, which might otherwise bias the results.
The results of our empirical investigation are clear and robust, implying that women's political influence does have an effect on fiscal outcomes: Women's right to vote has a statistically significant negative effect on cantonal government budget deficits.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the determinants of budget deficits and how gender differences could possibly affect these. We conclude on a-priori grounds that the gender differences that are most likely to affect preferences for budget deficits should be sought among potential gender differences in time discounting, life expectancy, altruism, risk perception and prudence, rather than among gender differences in economic constraints (e.g. income, labor market participation). Section 3 discusses the estimation methodology, while section 4 deals with our data. Section 5 takes our question to the data for Swiss cantons for the period 1955 to 1999. The final section concludes.
Gender differences and preferences for budget deficits
Introducing female suffrage changes the preferences and constraints of the median voter if women have different policy preferences and are subject to different economic circumstances than men. Following standard median voter reasoning (Hotelling, 1929; Metzler and Richards, 1981) , the franchise should hence matter for the government budget deficit if there are gender differences in preferences over the intertemporal allocation of spending on public goods and the intertemporal incidence of taxation. Focusing on the budget deficit rather than on the size of government allows us to abstract from all the reasons why women might want more or less public goods and transfers in general (see Funk and Gathmann, 2006) , and only focus on whether one should want such public goods or transfers to be paid for today through higher taxes or tomorrow through a higher public debt, given the size of the state. There is for example no reason why having stronger preferences for social spending should translate into stronger preferences for running budget deficits, while how you value spending today relative to spending tomorrow is crucial for this decision. To evaluate whether gender differences might affect preferences for budget deficits, we consider how the two genders' preferences for budget deficits might differ according to prevailing theories of budget deficits, taking into account the results of the literature on gender differences in preferences and relevant gender differences in economic circumstances.
The theoretical literature on budget deficits suggests four different categories of motives for running unbalanced government budgets: Normative fiscal policy motives; political economy motives (the deficit bias); inter-generational redistribution motives; and consumption smoothing/precautionary savings motives. The first two categories of budget determinants do not seem likely to be influenced by women's enfranchisement. Normative fiscal policy models such as the Barro tax smoothing model (Barro, 1979) and Keynesian countercyclical fiscal policy model prescribe running deficits in downturns and surpluses in upturns, with a zero (or neutral) deficit over the medium term. If women were found to suffer disproportionately from economic shocks or tax incidence, then we should expect women to want a more active countercyclical fiscal policy, but there is no reason to expect women to want persistently different levels of deficits than men with these theories in mind. Similarly, political economy motives for running deficits are based on the observation that deficits are shaped by the institutional setup within which elected politicians act in a democracy (time inconsistency a la Alesina and Tabellini, 1999; and common pool problems a la von Hagen and Harden, 1995) , and there are no obvious reasons why adding female voters to the electorate should change this institutional setup.
The third category, intergenerational redistribution motives for deficits, on the other hand, is likely to be influenced by gender differences and hence the franchise. Note that running a deficit today implies that taxpayers will have to pay for the servicing of the associated increase in the public debt in the future. Hence, if a voter does not expect to be paying taxes for long, he or she might deem a deficit today -yielding direct benefits in terms of higher public spending given tax revenues -less costly than another voter who expects to be around and pay taxes for longer. While the literature is still not conclusive, the rate of time preference may display gender differences. Viewing time preference, or patience, through the lenses of evolutionary psychology could lead to the prediction that women have a biological 5 bias toward caring more about the future than men, in that "a sex difference in discounting is predictable.
Because men have always had some chance of gaining fitness from short term expenditures of mating effort, whereas successful reproduction typically requires more prolonged parental investment by women, men should have evolved to discount the future more steeply than 5 Without getting into the debate on nature versus nurture, it is worth mentioning here that recent research has been able to establish the existence of biological gender differences in behavior, in that hormonal influences during pregnancy are found to play a role in determining the likelihood of certain behavioral traits which are usually considered gender stereotypical (see Baron-Cohen, 2003 ). But we still know very little about whether such biological gender differences are of any importance when viewed relative to the strong influence of socialization of the genders. there are some indications that we might expect women to prefer lower budget deficits for reasons of gender differences in time preference.
There is also some indication that women might want more precautionary public savings than men. The experimental and survey literature on gender differences in risk aversion is large and very active, converging on the conclusion that women in general seem to be more risk averse than men (see Croson and Gneezy, 2004 , for a recent review). But risk aversion is only a necessary condition for individuals to wish to save for precautionary reasons. We also need to assess whether women are more prudent in their attitudes toward risk than men to make a firm prediction 7 , and this is a question which to our knowledge has not yet been asked. 6 This prediction was the only one regarding time preference that we were able to find in the evolutionary psychology literature, but it is of course just one story among many possible stories about the evolutionary pressures facing humans in our Pleistocene past. An alternative story could for example be that men should have evolved to me more patient than women because men would have to invest a lot of time in accumulating sharper hunting skills than their male competitors in the quest to impress potential female mates (we are grateful to Paul Seabright for making this point).
7 Formally, risk aversion requires that the utility function is concave, whereas prudence is a characteristic which is captured by a negative third derivative of the utility function. See Browning and Lusardi (1996) for how prudence determines precautionary savings.
To summarize, the review of the literature allows for the identification of the most important factors which affect preferences for budget deficits. These include life expectancy, altruism, patience and prudence toward risk. On grounds of life expectancy alone, we would expect women to prefer lower budget deficits than men. Moreover, if women are more altruistic, more patient and/or more prudent in the face of risk than men, then we should expect women to want lower budget deficits than men. Our prior is therefore that granting women the right to vote should lead to lower budget deficits, but given the mixed evidence on gender differences in behavioral traits, the question is ultimately an empirical one.
Empirical specification
Let v be a dummy variable which takes a value of unity when women have the right to vote, and zero otherwise. Our baseline empirical specification then relates cantonal budget deficits to their determinants in the following linear manner:
where d c,t = b c,t /n c,t is the real budget deficit per capita in canton c at time t. The parameter ψ 1 is a time-invariant regression coefficient to be estimated, and α c , γ t and ε c,t
are, respectively, a canton fixed effect, a time fixed effect and a canton and time varying error term.
The previous theoretical and empirical literature on budget deficits proposes a list of additional explanatory variables which are relevant for explaining deficits. First, as noted in the previous section, Barro tax smoothing (Barro, 1979) and Keynesian countercyclical fiscal policy prescriptions imply that budget deficits should co-vary negatively with economic conditions. We therefore control for the rate of growth of real gross cantonal income (federal and international economic conditions will be captured through time fixed effects). Election cycles (Nordhaus, 1975 and Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) 
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In the baseline specification (I) including the dummy for female suffrage, canton and time fixed effects and dummy variables for outliers, the parameter estimate for the vote dummy of -117 is statistically significant at the 1% level, supporting the hypothesis that granting the right to vote to women reduces budget deficits. Specification (II) shows that the size and significance of the vote dummy are robust to the inclusion of the rate of growth of real gross cantonal income, the rate of growth of federal unconditional grants to cantons The number of observations decreases substantially when ideology is introduced (specifications (III) and (IV)), because the ideology of cantonal parliaments is missing for the cantons of Appenzell A. Rh. and Appenzell I. Rh., as well as for some years for Obwald and Nidwald. This decrease in sample size is the main reason for the moderate drop in the value of the parameter estimate of the vote dummy when ideology is introduced (rather than due to the introduction of ideology itself) 12 . Finally, we also check whether the size 10 Ideology of parliament could be expected to be caused by the franchise, thus leading to endogeneity problems when it is included. This is, however, not a problem here, since including ideology into a regression which already is restricted to include only the observations for which ideology is available does not change the parameter estimate for the vote dummy.
11 Although the sign of the parameter estimate is opposite to the theoretical prediction of Persson and Svensson (1989) , who find that right wing parties would run deficits in order to increase the level of debt and thereby reduce the possibilities for spending of future left wing governments.
12 Estimating specification (I) without the four cantons with missing observations yields a coefficient and significance of the parameter estimate for the vote dummy is driven by a single canton. Dropping one canton at a time, the coefficient for the vote dummy variable remains positive, not substantially different in size, and statistically significant at the 5% level 13 .
As a small aside on the findings of estimating specifications (II) to (IV), the lack of significance of the larger part of the control variables is at odds with the findings of To sum up, the parameter estimate for female suffrage is negative and statistically significant across all specifications. Regressions (I) to (IV) suggest that the impact lies somewhere between -97 and -117 Swiss francs per capita (measured in constant 1993 prices).
Beyond statistical significance, is such a coefficient estimate economically relevant? Compared to the cantonal average real budget deficit of 123.98 Swiss francs per capita for the time period under study, the answer is a cautious yes. For example, a back-of-the-envelope calculation for 1999 suggests that a change in the budget deficit of between -97 and -117
Swiss francs (measured in 1993 prices) leads to a change of between 1.25 to 1.50 percentestimate for the vote dummy variable equal to -98.3, not much different from the parameter estimate obtained in specifications (III) and (IV). Note that excluding the two cantons of Appenzell from the sample is not desirable since these cantons granted the right to vote to women relatively late, in 1989 and 1990 respectively, thereby introducing important time variation in the vote dummy. 13 We conducted this sequential exclusion of cantons using both the basic specification, and the specification including transfers per capita (all three forms of transfers, see footnote (9)). The results in both cases implied that the parameter estimate is robust. The only thing to note from this exercise is that the parameter estimate drops to about 73 when Geneva is excluded, implying some -expectedly -cross-cantonal heterogeneity. The results are not shown but can be obtained from the authors upon request.
14 It is desirable to include fixed effects in such regressions to control for cross cantonal differences in fiscal preferences, however. Krogstrup and Wälti (2007) explores this issue further for fiscal rules.
age points in the ratio of cantonal spending which is deficit financed. Since the cantonal average budget was in surplus by an amount corresponding to half a percent of average cantonal spending in 1999, our estimates suggest that if women had not had the right to vote in 1999, the average cantonal budget would instead have been in deficit of about 0.75 and 1 percent of average cantonal spending. Compounded over decades, this could have a considerable effects on accumulated cantonal debt levels.
The literature estimating the impact of female suffrage on the size of the state using Swiss cantonal data consistently finds that the introduction of female voters significantly reduces cantonal spending. Hence, at least part of the reduction in deficits due to the franchise in Swiss cantons is likely to derive from expenditure reductions. To examine whether this is the whole story behind the suffrage effect on deficits, we regress real cantonal spending per capita and real cantonal tax revenues per capita on the vote dummy and control variables. The outcome of these regressions is presented in Table 2 . Table 2 shows that the introduction of the right to vote for women is associated with lower spending as well as lower taxes 15 , suggesting that on the average, Swiss women voters are more conservative regarding both the size of the state and deficit financing of expenditures than Swiss men 16 . 
Omitted variables
We can think of four omitted variables which could potentially be correlated with the introduction of the franchise and could potentially affect cantonal deficits. First, Swiss women have generally been less educated than Swiss men during the sample period 17 .
Therefore, as women become part of the electorate, the average level of education of the A second potential omitted variable is the income level of the electorate. There is clearly a potential link from level of income to preferences for the composition and level of public goods provision, but it is less clear that there should be a link from income levels to preferences for deficit financing these public goods. One story could be that lower income individuals are likely to be more credit constrained than higher-income individuals, and might hence want the cantonal government to do more borrowing on their behalf. But this would imply that women should prefer higher, not lower, deficits. Hence, we again conclude that the average income level of voters is unlikely to be driving our results.
Third, the timing of women's suffrage and the timing of women's choice to enter the labor force could be correlated. If this is the case, then women's taxable income from work outside the household might increase income tax revenues of the canton at the time women get the right to vote. It is unfortunately not possible to directly test this hypothesis, as there is no yearly data on either labor market participation or employment by gender and canton 19 . We instead test this hypothesis indirectly by including real income per capita in the regressions (see Table 1 , specification (V)). Measured income per capita should increase as women's income from work outside the household becomes included in the national accounts. Since real income per capita is not significant and does not change the parameter estimate for the vote dummy, we consider that female labor market participation is unlikely to be driving the results 20 .
Fourth, women were granted the right to vote in a referendum in which only men would vote. It is hence possible that the date of female enfranchisement captures a change in the underlying preferences of male voters, which in turn also affects men's preferences
19 Data on labor market participation and employment by canton and gender only exists in ten year intervals starting from 1980, from the Swiss decennial population census. Funk and Gathmann (2006) interpolate the remaining yearly data points, and use this data in cantonal panel regressions. Using interpolated data series would not make much sense here, as exact yearly changes around the time of enfranchisement would be needed to test the hypothesis. 20 We also tried including first differences of income per capita, with no change in the conclusions. 
Conclusion
If women have different preferences than men -be these of biological, social or cultural origin -then the political influence of women has the potential to affect macroeconomic outcomes through qualitative changes in policy or household decisions. Important economic effects of empowering women have been documented at the micro level. At the macro level, however, the literature on the effect of gender gaps in preferences has been narrowly focused on the impact of political gender gaps on the provision of public goods and the size of the state. This paper adds to the literature on the effect of women's political and economic influence on macroeconomic outcomes by estimating the impact of female empowerment on government budget deficits, and hence, ultimately on public debt levels.
A panel regression analysis of the impact of the franchise on budget deficits in Swiss cantons shows that Swiss women indeed prefer lower budget deficits than men. The effect is small, but significant and very robust, implying that female enfranchisement may have mitigated the debt built-ups of the last decades. On a more general note, the findings suggest that vesting economic and political power with women is likely to change macroeconomic outcomes, not just because female empowerment doubles the available amount of talent or labor in the economy, but because women's preferences, and therefore decisions, are different from men's.
While our research design and macroeconomic data does not allow us to identify the exact underlying gender gap in preferences causing the results, the analysis does suggest that we are likely to be capturing differences in life expectancy, altruism, prudence and/or patience, rather than gender differences in economic constraints, such as income, education levels or labor market participation. The limited geographical scope of the analysis unfortunately does not allow us to deal with the question of nature versus nurture as the ultimate cause of these gender differences. If the finding is due to an underlying biological gender difference, then the effect of suffrage on budget deficits should be qualitatively the same across diverse cultures 21 . To address the question of nature versus nurture, the study could hence be extended by estimating the impact of female suffrage on budget balances for a set of more culturally diverse countries. We leave this for future research.
gender differences in the willingness to seek and accept competitive situations.
[9] Camerer, C., G. The basic structure of the model is a two period model of the government budget, in which the first period budget balance is determined by the median voter through an election. The total population consists of n citizens, of which half is male and half is female.
All citizens have the same fixed per period income which, without loss of generality, can be normalized to zero 22 . Moreover, each citizen receives an equal amount of net government transfers in each of the two periods, g t , t = 1, 2, where the net transfer is defined as transfers received from government less taxes paid 23 . The assumption that all citizens receive the same transfer clearly does not reflect reality very well, but is a simplification which underscores our results, and also allows us to abstract from deficits arising due to common pool problems 24 .
Assume for simplicity that citizens are fully credit constrained (a partial credit constraint would do, but a full credit constraint simplifies the model significantly). The citizens derive utility from total consumption, which under the credit constraint and the normalization of private income to zero becomes equal to the net transfer. Thus, citizen i's utility is given by the utility function:
where u i is the felicity utility function and β i = 1 1+ρ i is the time discount factor for citizen i. Assume further that:
To keep to the basic assumptions of the median voter model, assume that citizens differ along one dimension only. In terms of the model, this dimension could for example be citizens' time preference, β i , or the degree to which citizens are prudent and want to save for precautionary reasons, u i . We make the example of gender differences in time preference
here. Assume that the time discount factor derives from one of two distributions, namely that of men and that of women. The β i,h is the subjective discount factor of individual i in gender group h, and is given by β i,h = 2i n β h , h = m, w and i = 1, ..., n 2
where β w and β m are the relative weights given to the future by the individual who cares most about the future within each of the two groups. Assume that on average women care more about the future than men:
Assumption (4) on the distribution of the subjective time discount factors may seem ad hoc, but the particular shape of the distribution is of no consequence for the results, as long as the median woman cares more about the future than the median man 25 . The government's only role in this model is to set net transfers to its citizens by implementing the budget deficit policy announced prior to election (more on the election below). In doing so, it is allowed to borrow or lend at the relevant interest rate as a means of financing potential deficits/surpluses. The government is assumed to fully respect the intertemporal budget constraint, and there is therefore no issue of debt default in the model. Let b denote the government budget deficit in period one, such that b = ng 1 . The intertemporal budget constraint thus becomes:
where R = 1 1+r
. We assume that the economy is small and open, and hence, that the interest rate is fixed at the world level. Maximizing (2) with respect to first and second period net transfers, subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (6), yields the two first order conditions which implicitly give the preferred level of net transfers of citizen i:
F OC 2 : g *
where asterisks denote preferred policies, and g * 1 hence denotes the preferred net transfer in period one of citizen i. Note that (7) implies that the optimal transfer depends negatively on the relative weight that the citizen places on future consumption, β i .
We now turn to the elections. Let two parties, which each derive utility solely from being in office, compete for government at the beginning of period one. The party which wins takes office immediately, at the beginning of period one, and stays in office till the end of period two. The two parties campaign by announcing a fiscal policy to be implemented if they win the election. Since their only objective is to be elected for office, they will both announce the policy which maximizes their respective number of votes. Citizen i will vote for the party with the announced deficit policy that attains her highest utility level. As is standard in median voter models, both parties end up announcing the preferred policy of the median voter, which hence will be the winning policy 26 . All we have to do to know the implemented fiscal policy is therefore to derive the preferred policy of the median voter.
The identity of the median voter depends on who has the right to vote. Assume first that only men have the right to vote. The time preference parameter of the median man by assumption, this implies that
The median voter has a lower preferred budget deficit when women are included in the electorate under assumption (5).
